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DISSONANCE IN GLOBAL FINANCIAL LAW 
DALIT FLAISZHAKER∗ 
This article explores whether the post-GFC global financial architecture is 
likely to provide efficient regulation capable of preventing a future crisis from 
occurring. The article starts with a brief overview of the emergence in the 
1970s of global financial architecture. A thorough descriptive analysis of the 
post-crisis architecture follows, raising serious doubts regarding the current 
architecture’s ability to accomplish its goal. This analysis is performed in 
two stages, taking first an outsider’s perspective on the changes the 
architecture underwent after the crisis and moving then to the inside — the 
structure and contents of the architecture. Using macro-prudential 
methodological tools, the establishment of the Financial Stability Board is 
reviewed, along with three cutting edge regulations: the Basel III framework 
for banking, the IOSCO’s recommendation for money market funds, and the 
FSB’s recommendations regarding repurchase agreements. Pointing out the 
architecture’s perceived failure to provide stability due to severe regulatory 
arbitrage, the article then widens the lens to explore the implications of the 
above regulation. The article suggests that the current architecture 
encourages ‘financialisation’ and pushes the financial system and the real 
economy further apart. Consequently, the article raises normative concerns 
regarding the legal foundations of the global financial architecture, and its 
legitimacy. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Following the global financial crisis beginning in 2007–2008 (‘GFC’), financial 
regulation seems to be at the centre of current lawmaking in the economic 
sphere. As many commentators hold regulation (or lack thereof) responsible, if 
not for the occurrence of the crisis then at the very least for not mitigating it, 
this regulation has become a target of widespread interest. Regulators 
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worldwide, both nationally and internationally, have produced reports 
investigating the crisis and have promoted new reforms intended to prevent the 
next one. Academic writing has not lagged behind, as thorough discussions 
have been devoted to solving the trillion-dollar problem: how to create a stable 
financial system, implementing the lessons the GFC has taught us. 
This article is different. It will not focus on the stability issue per se. Although 
stability will be investigated in the article, an understanding of it will be used 
as a necessary platform on which to build the article’s main argument. It will 
be argued that to crown stability as the goal of global financial regulation is to 
obscure other critical implications that this regulation has for the real 
economy.1 It will be argued that the emphasis given to stability supports a 
separation of the financial system from the real economy, and that the expected 
consequences of the current global financial regulation raise serious doubts not 
only regarding its effectiveness, but also regarding its legitimacy. 
Before we can grasp the findings of the article, we need to consider the current 
financial architecture.  
Part II of this article is a prologue, taking a quick journey back in time to the 
early 1970s and covering the period leading up to the GFC. The shift from the 
Bretton Woods monetary regime to a regime of floating exchange rates with 
free capital movements created an urgent need for global regulatory 
cooperation. This Part will briefly describe the emergence of global regulatory 
bodies, and their regulatory soft law products. The global financial architecture 
holds the potential to level the global playing field to an even plane of safety 
and competitiveness, which will resist a regulatory race to the bottom, for the 
benefit of all states.  
The GFC marked a turning point for the global financial architecture. Part III 
will briefly describe the crisis, focusing on its most valuable lesson: the need to 
create regulation using a macro-prudential approach. Regulating each sector or 
institution separately (micro-prudential regulation) is insufficient to address the 
systemic character of financial risk. The implementation of macro-prudential 
policy in the global architecture after the crisis resulted in three major changes, 
described in the fourth Part: the founding of a new ‘super’ regulatory body — 
the Financial Stability Board; the creation of massive new regulation, intended 
to cover financial institutions and activities not regulated prior to the crisis and 
to tighten supervision in the already supervised fields; and the efforts made to 
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enhance the coercive power of the regulation in order to achieve improved 
(national) obedience to it. From an outsider’s perspective, the post-crisis 
architecture appears stronger and more coherent than before.  
The fifth Part closely examines the above changes. A two-stage legal critical 
analysis is performed. First, the analysis examines the structural change, with 
the FSB now positioned over the pre-existing three specialised sectorial 
authorities. Re-depositing the creation of prudential regulation with the same 
bodies that had proved themselves unable to mitigate the GFC may be 
problematic. The structural change may arguably be considered an 
improvement compared to the previous architecture, yet it is far from being 
adequate. 
Second, the article inspects the change in the contents of global regulation. 
Three pieces of regulation in the banking field (‘Basel III’), the money market 
funds (‘MMFs’) field, and the repurchase agreement (‘repo’) market are 
compared. These pieces of regulation are at the cutting-edge of the current 
architecture’s work. They offer a good case for comparison as the crisis exposed 
the vulnerability of the MMFs and repos to the known event of a ‘bank run’. 
Comparing these solutions offered to the similar problem demonstrates that, 
whereas banks are regulated in a stringent manner likely to be effective, MMFs 
and repos are not. This creates a regulatory arbitrage, which is likely to lead 
credit to be accumulated in the less-constrained shadow banking sector. This 
concentration of credit constitutes systemic risk, as from there it can spread to 
other parts of the financial system. Despite the unified appearance of today’s 
regulatory regimes, fragmentation is still present in the current architecture. 
Failing to provide for a coherent treatment and coverage, the new global 
regulation is likely to be ineffective in preventing the next crisis.  
The sixth Part then turns to observe the expected consequences of the regulatory 
arbitrage, this time not focusing solely on the effectiveness of the regulation. 
Explaining how the phenomenon of ‘financialisation’ causes estrangement of 
the financial system from the real economy, I argue that the new global 
regulation is likely to push the two further apart. The conclusion is that, while 
focusing on the goal of stability, the global architecture could be sabotaging the 
‘meta-goal’ of the financial system — promoting the real economy. 
This conclusion raises questions about the legitimacy of the new global 
regulation. The severe repercussions of financial regulation as described, along 
with the fact that regulation occurs at the global level, point to a unique 
democratic deficit. The concluding Part raises this currently unresolved issue, 
and opens a path for future research on how to make things better. 
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II WHAT DO WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT 
‘GLOBAL FINANCIAL LAW’? 
Nowadays much of financial regulation is created in the global sphere, and 
injected into national law. This Part describes, in a nutshell, the emergence of 
global financial law in the early 1970s and its development into its current form. 
This historic overview will provide the framework needed for the subsequent 
discussion, as it will explain the justification for creating financial law at the 
global level, and will identify the leading bodies that create it and how they 
function. 
The 1970s were a turbulent decade as far as the international economic 
atmosphere was concerned. The major change was the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods international monetary regime, which had lasted from the end of World 
War II.2 The Bretton Woods regime was based on fixed exchange rates, 
operated by pegging currencies to the US dollar and pegging the dollar to the 
gold rate, and controls on capital movements between states. These two features 
enabled each state to participate in the international regime, while preserving 
the ability to create monetary policy independently. It is common to refer to the 
US’s ‘closing of the gold window’ (that is, the decision to cancel the pegging 
of the dollar exchange rate to gold), in the summer of 1971, as the point of the 
Bretton Woods regime’s collapse. Gradually, after the collapse, most of the 
industrial countries which likewise cancelled the fixed exchange rate 
mechanisms had also to cancel the limitations on international capital 
movements in an effort to maintain their ability to pursue independent monetary 
policy. States found that it was impossible to maintain at the same time floating 
exchange rates, limitations on capital movement and independent monetary 
implementation — a predicament known as the ‘open-economy trilemma’ or 
the ‘impossible trinity’.3 These developments resulted in a new international 
monetary regime, based on floating exchange rates and free capital flow, which 
has existed till the present. 
Lifting the capital barriers was a major factor in facilitating the integration 
between national financial systems, and ultimately an interwoven global 
financial system.4 Other factors encouraging this process included: 
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technological development (such as the development of computers and 
advanced communications) which made it possible to execute international 
financial transactions quickly and efficiently; increased international trade, 
which led to a growing need for credit, provided by the inter-state financial 
system; the desire to spread investments due to fluctuations in interest rates 
during those years; and various states’ policies supporting the growth of the 
financial sector and its integration among countries (for example, by the easing 
of regulatory limitations).5 These were policies that were partially based on the 
‘Washington consensus’,6 and aimed to liberalise economic activity and 
encourage free markets. From this point onwards, the new monetary regime 
combined with the factors just mentioned to generate a ‘financial globalisation’, 
resulting in a globalised financial system. 
A prominent example of this process was the development of the Eurodollars 
market, which included banking activity performed in US dollars outside the 
territory of the US (mostly in London). This market was composed of high sum 
transactions amounting in 1988 to USD 4 trillion.7 One of the reasons for the 
development of this market was banks’ ability to avoid US regulatory limits 
and reserve requirements when operating outside the US. A second example of 
this financial globalisation was the transformation of the banking system from 
a system based in a home state, to a system having many branches in different 
states. The creation of a very active foreign exchange market was a third 
example.8F8  
The creation of a new global financial system, in addition to the national ones, 
answered the pressing needs of that time, and had various potential advantages. 
The principal advantage attributed to the global financial system was its ability 
to support global growth, which would be nearly impossible to achieve without 
it. However, trying to solve some problems may create new and unexpected 
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6 The ‘Washington Consensus’ is a set of policy reforms, including, for example, the deregulation 
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ones. The global financial system, as it turned out, introduced a new challenge 
for national regulators.  
Traditionally, the primary goal for financial regulators was to maintain the 
stability of their national financial system. Stability is important for financial 
regulators since the financial system is a crucial link in the chain of economic 
activity, and a crisis in the financial system can develop into a much wider 
economic crisis.9 At the same time, too many regulatory restrictions on the 
activity of the financial system can lead to too much stability, which may 
impede economic activity by not supplying all the credit needed to support 
economic growth. Balancing the degree of stability of the financial system at 
optimal levels requires a dynamic responsive regulatory approach; the regulator 
needs to be attuned to the needs of the economy so as to ease the restraints in 
the right measure and at the right time.  
The regulatory challenge became harder to manage as the financial system grew 
global. When the centre of the financial system was national, regulators had 
better control over the financial institutions in their territory. Linking the 
national financial systems to a global system created a double-edged sword. On 
the one hand, due to globalisation, capital and financial institutions could move 
(or threaten to move) to countries with more lenient regulatory regimes. The 
problem was that the desire of countries to attract capital and to encourage local 
financial institutions to compete with foreign ones, or to appeal to foreign 
institutions to establish themselves in those countries, might lead to a regulatory 
race to the bottom. The expected outcome of such a race could be damage to 
the stability of the financial system. Simultaneously, due to the close ties 
between financial systems, each system had become much more prone to a 
crisis started in other countries. In that sense, a country with more lenient rules 
could pose a danger not only to itself but also to other countries, since crises 
can move easily and quickly from one country to another. Combining these two 
phenomena — the regulatory race to the bottom and contagion — led to the 
understanding that regulating the financial system only at the state level was no 
longer sufficient, and that global cooperation was needed in order to create 
effective financial regulation.10 Setting standards at the global level that were 
both beneficial and uniform across countries could reduce the incentive for a 
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regulatory race to the bottom and improve the international prudential level, 
thus minimising the risk of contagion, for the benefit of all countries.11 
Indeed, in 1974 the G-10 leaders established the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (the ‘Committee’). The Committee aimed at creating regulatory 
standards for international banks, and was initially composed of representatives 
of central banks from 11 countries, broadening its membership to 28 countries 
today.12 The founding of the Committee represented global regulatory 
cooperation in response to the concerns raised following the collapses of the 
German Herstatt Bank, the American Franklin National Bank, and later on of 
the Italian Banco Ambrosiano,13 which spread panic in capital markets and led 
to a halt in international financial activity.14 A year after its foundation, the 
Committee published its Report on the Supervision of Banks’ Foreign 
Establishments (the Concordat),15 which set rules for central bank bailouts of 
failing banks, differentiating between the bank’s home state, and states in which 
that bank had opened branches.  
The Committee’s main achievement was the Basel Capital Accord, which in its 
first version of 1988 set the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets for banks at 
8%.16 The capital ratio is a good example of the two phenomena described 
above, since a higher ratio enhances the resilience of banks, and lowers the 
chances of insolvency. On the other hand, a higher ratio entails costs for banks, 
which may lead to a regulatory race to the bottom in the desire to improve 
competitiveness.17 During the following years, the Basel Accord underwent 
several changes known as ‘Basel II’, ‘Basel 2.5’, and recently ‘Basel III’ — 
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which will be discussed below — in order to adjust the regulation to changes 
in the financial market.  
Subsequent to the founding of the Committee, a few attempts were made to 
form a regulatory body for the securities sector, resulting in the establishment 
of the Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(‘IOSCO’) in 1983. Over the years, IOSCO enlarged its membership from 48 
countries to almost all countries today. Initially, IOSCO focused on cooperation 
between states mainly in regard to fraud in the stock market. Gradually, IOSCO 
turned its attention to problems resulting from the ongoing globalisation of the 
capital and stock markets. In the 1980s and 1990s IOSCO initiated several 
reports,18 the findings of which were not able to achieve wide implementation 
among states. In 2002 IOSCO created a Memorandum of Mutual 
Understandings regarding cooperation and information sharing between 
national securities supervisors, signed by most of its member states.19  
The third step taken in the formation of the pre-crisis global financial 
architecture was the establishment of the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (‘IAIS’) in 1994.20 IAIS aims to handle the challenges arising from 
the globalisation of the insurance field, particularly the reinsurance field. IAIS 
includes representatives from regulatory and supervisory authorities of nearly 
140 states, amounting to 97% of the world insurance market, in addition to 
observers from international insurance companies. In 2003 IAIS published 
standards for effective supervision of insurance companies.21  
To summarise, financial regulation was created at the global level from the 
1970s onwards, by specialised bureaucratic bodies, each within its own field of 
expertise, divided between the three traditional sectors of finance: banking, 
securities, and insurance. The regulation was created in the form of soft law, 
with different enforcement success.22 We can identify the three bureaucratic 
bodies — the Committee, IOSCO and IAIS — as key components of the global 
regulatory financial architecture, given their common objective of creating 
                                                 
18 Singer (n 11) 72–6. 
19 See OICU-IOSCO (Web Page) <https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=about_iosco>. For 
the globalisation of capital markets, see Singer (n 11) 73–6 and 92–5. 
20 In this article, the scope of ‘financial regulation’ relates to the three traditional sectors of 
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21 See IAIS (Web Page) <https://www.iaisweb.org/page/about-the-iais>.  
22 Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rulemaking in the 21st Century 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) 60–7, 117. See there for an explanation why the dichotomy 
of hard/soft law is not accurate, as will be explained in Part IV. 
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global stability, and their common practice of using soft law mechanisms, and 
notwithstanding their differences.  
And then came the big bang.  
III THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS LESSONS 
The question of what caused the severest financial crisis since the Great 
Depression can be answered in several ways. A number of factors have been 
identified as being responsible for the GFC, such as the deregulation of 
financial markets in the years predating the crisis,23 and the more innovative 
and complex financial products appearing in those years. It is also possible that 
a number of factors combined contributed to its occurrence, in a kind of a 
‘perfect storm’.24  
However, it is common to regard the immediate cause of the crisis as the 
bursting of the US housing bubble. Low interest rates since the 1990s, along 
with the flow of foreign capital into the US, increased the flood of capital into 
the real estate market. This capital in search of borrowers increased the 
incidence of what were called ‘sub-prime’ housing loans. Sub-prime loans are 
riskier than normal loans due to the borrowers’ questionable future solvency; 
these loans are considered less than prime.25 Recipients of these loans were 
usually unable to receive credit in the mainstream banking system, hence 
receiving it through alternative financing channels.   
What made matters even worse was that these loans underwent a process of 
securitisation. Securitisation consolidated loans with different risk levels, in 
ways that became increasingly sophisticated, into ‘Mortgage Backed 
Securities’ (‘MBSs’). MBSs were considered safe, due to the risk 
diversification they supposedly enabled, and were marketed by distinguished 
investment banks. MBSs were bought by solid investors among which were 
banks. This led borrowers who were initially rejected by the banking system 
indirectly back into it. At the same time, innovative financial instruments such 
                                                 
23 The fact that there was more activity at the global level, as just described, does not contradict 
the general view of ‘deregulation’.  
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as ‘Credit Default Swaps’ (‘CDSs’)26 were created with the purpose of 
protecting the MBSs against the insolvency of borrowers, and thus enhanced 
the safety of MBSs. The financial alchemy transformed great risks joined 
together into a seemingly safe investment product. 
In 2006–2007 interest rates began to rise. As a result, many borrowers who held 
sub-prime loans experienced difficulties in making their mortgage payments. 
Financial companies that sold CDSs were forced to answer growing margin 
calls in addition to paying compensation and began to suffer heavy losses 
themselves. In 2007 a relatively small financial crisis occurred, which was 
considered at that time one that the supervisory system was able to block. 
However, in September 2008 one of the biggest investment banks in the US — 
Lehman Brothers — collapsed. Due to the ensuing overall panic, its collapse 
led to a chain of problems not only in many of the financial institutions — banks 
and non-banks — connected to Lehman, but also in ones that had minor 
connections to it, due to the overall panic. After the collapse, it became evident 
that even established financial institutions, such as the American International 
Group (AIG), were no longer able to meet their obligations.27 This led to a 
general loss of confidence in the financial market, and even financial 
institutions that could lend to other institutions refused to do so for fear of non-
repayment, so that a general credit crunch swept the US financial market. From 
there, the crisis spread to other countries such as the UK and Germany, leading 
to a European economic crisis. 
As described above, financial regulation created at the global level prior to the 
crisis was divided between the three traditional sectors of banking, securities 
and insurance. In each sector, the main focus of the regulation was on ensuring 
the stability of each individual financial institution. For example, the banking 
regulation was designed by the Committee in the regulatory framework of the 
Basel Accord. The Basel Accord determined that the capital ratio that each bank 
needed to hold must be sufficient to enable the bank to absorb losses. The 
underlying assumption was that, if the regulation would be able to ensure the 
stability of each individual bank, the stability of the banking system would 
consequently be ensured. That was because the banking system is composed of 
the aggregate of all the individual banks. Similarly, the premise behind the 
divided sectorial supervision was that ensuring the stability of each financial 
                                                 
26 CDSs are financial derivatives, which enable one party to the contract to buy protection against 
the risk of credit default. In the event of such default, the protection seller pays the buyer the 
amount of money that buyer would have received from the (defaulted) third party.  
27 ‘The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report’, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (January 2011) 
<https://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report/>. 
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sector separately would ensure the stability of the financial system as a whole, 
the whole being the sum of its parts.  
The crisis destroyed these assumptions. It became clear that addressing the 
stability of each financial institution/sector, following micro-prudential policy, 
is not sufficient to guarantee the stability of the system. The crisis demonstrated 
the need to supplement micro policy with macro-prudential policy. Macro-
prudential policy focuses on systemic stability, and is essential for two primary 
reasons.28 First, micro-supervision does not address cross-institutional and 
cross-sectorial linkages and interactions across the financial system. Many 
financial institutions are connected to other institutions from the same sector 
and from other sectors, creating a web of interdependence.29 When those 
connections become channels for transferring difficulties on a large scale, they 
require close attention from regulators. Second, the pace at which new financial 
products are developed requires broad and dynamic supervision of all financial 
activities and the institutions performing them. Concentrating only on the three 
traditional sectors ignores new financial activity happening outside the formal 
system, activity which has potential effects on the financial system (for 
example, the non-bank sector).  
Macro-prudential policy, the cardinal regulatory solution derived from the 
crisis, is intended to enhance the stability of the financial system by addressing 
its systemic potential for risk.30 To achieve this goal, macro-prudential policy 
utilises a few sets of tools, among which the two relevant for our upcoming 
discussion are: a structural tool — creating coordination and cooperation 
between the different bodies supervising the financial system; and a contents 
tool — developing new regulatory means to supervise the financial system as a 
whole.  
While Part II of this article described the pre-crisis architecture of the global 
financial law, and Part III has provided us with an understanding of the primary 
                                                 
28 Robert Hockett, ‘The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional “Safety and Soundness” to 
“Systemic Stability” in Financial Supervision’ (2015) 9(2) Virginia Law and Business Review 
201, 206–14. As Hockett describes, the macro-prudential policy predated the recent crisis, yet 
received a great boost after it: at 204.  
29 A very simplified example could be a bank that borrows money from a different bank, lends it 
to an investment fund (profiting on the interest margin), and buys insurance against default 
from an insurance company. If the investment fund fails to pay back the loan, the second bank 
will activate its insurance policy, and may experience difficulties returning the money it has 
itself borrowed. 
30 Gabriele Galati and Richhild Moessner, ‘Macroprudential Policy: A Literature Review’ (2013) 
27(5) Journal of Economic Surveys 846, 847–8. 
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insights of the recent crisis, the fourth Part will explore how these lessons were 
manifested in the post-crisis global architecture. 
IV THE POST-CRISIS ARCHITECTURE FROM AN 
OUTSIDER’S PERSPECTIVE 
Three major changes were made to the regulatory financial architecture after 
the crisis, as part of the implementation of the newly introduced macro-
prudential policy. The changes will be shortly mentioned at first, and elaborated 
separately afterwards. The first change was a structural change: the 
establishment of a new supervisory authority. The second was a change in 
contents, creating new regulations. The third change concerned new means 
taken to strengthen the enforcement capabilities of the regulatory bodies.  
The structural change took place in 2009, when the G-20 announced the 
establishment of the Financial Stability Board (‘FSB’).31 The members of the 
FSB are the G-20 countries (usually represented by their central bank and 
ministry of finance), in addition to global and international bodies, such as the 
Committee, and the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’). The FSB was 
founded on an existing platform — the Financial Stability Forum (‘FSF’).  
The FSB’s chief objective is to supervise the work of the global standard-setting 
bodies.32 To achieve this goal, the FSB’s mandate includes the task of 
monitoring the development of macro-prudential policy, based on 
vulnerabilities identified in the global financial system. The FSB is to review 
the coordination between the regulatory authorities, and to make sure they 
collaborate with each other. The FSB is also charged with the task of promoting 
member jurisdictions’ implementation of agreed commitments, standards and 
policy recommendations through monitoring, peer review, and disclosure.  
During the establishment of the FSB, a choice had to be made regarding the 
institutional design of the global financial architecture. There are two 
acceptable models for financial regulatory design: the single regulator model and 
                                                 
31 The G-20 is an economic forum of 20 leading countries. See G-20, ‘Declaration on 
Strengthening the Financial System’, G-20 Information Centre (2 April 2009) 
<http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html>; Eric Helleiner, ‘What Role for the New 
Financial Stability Board? The Politics of International Standards after the Crisis’ (2010) 1(3) 
Global Policy 282. For global financial governance see also Giulio Napolitano, ‘The “Puzzle” 
of Global Governance after the Financial Crisis’ in Sabino Cassese et al, Global Administrative 
Law: An Italian Perspective (Robert Schumann Centre for Advanced Studies, 2012) 31, 32–4. 
32 Financial Stability Board, ‘Charter of the Financial Stability Board’ (June 2012) arts 1–2 
<http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Charter-with-revised-Annex-FINAL.pdf>. 
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multiple specialised authorities.33 The single regulator model, as implied by its 
name, consists of one authority that is responsible for covering all financial 
regulation. The second model is composed of several authorities. These 
regulatory authorities can be divided up in a sectorial manner, so that each of 
the three traditional sectors has its own authority. That was the model of the 
global architecture prior to the crisis. Responsibility can otherwise be divided 
according to the different objectives of the authorities. For example, one 
authority can be responsible for financial stability and another for consumer 
protection, in a sub-model known as the ‘twin peaks’ model.   
Picturing an axis, with the single regulator model on one side, and the multiple 
regulators on the other (regardless of their exact division), we can locate the 
FSB more or less at its midpoint. The FSB primarily supervises the other 
standard-setting bodies and does not create regulation itself; hence it is not a 
single regulator model. Yet it is not a pure multiple regulator model either, as 
there exists another supervising regulator over the standard setting bodies. The 
current architecture can be regarded as a ‘consolidated’ model, which will 
enable more coordination than the pre-existing one.  
In parallel with the structural change, a massive expansion of the regulation 
produced by the global regulatory bodies occurred. The need to supplement the 
pre-crisis micro-prudential regulation with macro-prudential policy validates 
this expansion. The regulation expanded to include new financial institutions 
and new activities, which were not covered by former regulation. The 
regulation also expanded in regard to previously regulated institutions, which 
became subject to more stringent demands.   
The new regulation has four focal points. The first is ‘Basel III: A Global 
Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks’. Basel III includes 
significant updates to the capital ratio set by its predecessor (Basel 2.5) and 
                                                 
33 For a discussion of these models see Eric J Pan, ‘Structural Reform of Financial Regulation’ 
(2011) 19(3) Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 796, 816–24. Choosing the 
appropriate model for a national regulator involves choosing between different pros and cons 
of each model, such as more coherent regulation in the single regulator versus more separation 
of powers in the multiple authorities. See also Eric J Pan, ‘Challenge of International 
Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental 
Networks’ (2010) 11(1) Chicago Journal of International Law 243. For the importance of new 
regulatory design see Olufunmilayo B Arewa, ‘Financial Markets and Networks Implications 
for Financial Market Regulation’ (2009) 78 University of Cincinnati Law Review 613, 626. 
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adds a counter-cyclical capital buffer. Basel III also includes new demands on 
banks, such as the liquidity coverage ratio and the leverage ratio.34  
The second focal point is the approach towards the shadow banking sector, 
which is defined as ‘credit intermediation involving entities and activities 
outside the regular banking system’.35 The need to regulate this sector was 
exposed during the GFC, which started with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
an investment bank (hence not a licensed depository institution), and intensified 
in the face of the connections between this sector and the traditional banking 
sector. Relevant parts of the Basel III framework and of the shadow banking 
regulation will be further investigated in the next Part. 
The third focal point is regulation of ‘Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions’ (‘SIFIs’) which, due to their size and connections, have a greater 
potential to affect the financial markets than smaller institutions do. This kind 
of institution requires stricter treatment, which includes the enlargement of their 
loss-absorbing capacities, their orderly liquidation, and closer supervision at the 
national level.36  
The fourth focal point is the regulation of derivatives. ‘Over the counter’ 
(‘OTC’) derivatives are contracts between two financial sides, whereby one 
side takes on a financial obligation derived from the future position of a certain 
asset. As those contracts are bilateral, and tailored for the individual needs of 
each deal, most of them have in the past not been supervised. Yet derivatives 
have potentially immense impacts on the financial market, as the global 
                                                 
34 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for 
More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems’, Bank for International Settlements (December 
2010, revised June 2011) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf>; Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Risk.Monitoring 
Tools’, Bank for International Settlements (January 2013) <http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbs238.pdf> (‘Liquidity coverage ratio’) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’, Bank for International Settlements (September 
2012) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf>. Basel 3 was finalised in December 2017: Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: Finalising Post-Crisis Reforms’, Bank for 
International Settlements (December 2017) <https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf>. 
35 FSB’s definition; see ‘Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues: A Background Note of the 
Financial Stability Board’, Financial Stability Board (11 April 2011) <http://www.fsb. 
org/2011/04/shadow-banking-scoping-the-issues/>. See also ‘Strengthening Oversight and 
Regulation of Shadow Banking: An Overview of Policy Recommendations’, Financial Stability 
Board (29 August 2013) 2 <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130 
829a.pdf>. 
36 FSB in consultation with the IMF, ‘Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision: 
Recommendations for Enhanced Supervision’, Financial Stability Board (2 November 2010) 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101101.pdf>. 
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derivatives market is valued at over USD 500 trillion (the notional value of the 
OTC Market) and involves many financial institutions.37 Efforts are being 
made, for example through pushing OTC derivatives into formal exchange, and 
thus bringing derivatives into the regulatory net, to subject them to supervision. 
On top of these structural and contents changes, the third change involves new 
means taken to strengthen global regulation’s enforcement power. This is not a 
‘change’ in the simple meaning of the word, since enhancing the enforcement 
of regulation has been an important goal of the architecture since its 
emergence.38 The financial playing field cannot be levelled without all 
countries accepting global regulation. Global financial regulation is classified 
as soft law, in the form of standards and recommendations, which, in contrast 
to hard international law, lacks official enforcement mechanisms.   
Hence, a problem of cooperation may arise, as a single state may have the 
incentive to individually defect from the cooperation.39 Such a state can then 
enjoy the benefits that global regulation supplies — the benefits of global 
stability deriving from all other states obeying the rules — while taking 
advantage of its own non-restricted status.40 To cope with this problem, global 
financial regulation developed enforcement measures, even prior to the crisis. 
These included the use of market discipline, as the market punishes states (for 
example, by imposing higher interest rates on them) that do not apply global 
standards. They also included institutional backup from formal international 
bodies, for example through the IMF making loans conditional on the 
implementation of global financial standards.41 These enforcement measures 
are unique to global financial regulation and contribute to the ‘hardening’ of 
financial soft law. Thus, financial regulation can retain the benefits of soft law 
                                                 
37 As of December 2009: ‘Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reform’, Financial Stability 
Board (October 2010) Annex 2 <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/ 
r_101025.pdf>. Gross market values were around USD 13 trillion in 2017: ‘Statistical Release: 
OTC Derivatives Statistics at End June 2017’, Bank for International Settlements (2 November 
2017) 2 <https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1711.pdf>.  
38 For the need of global regulation for domestic implementation see Benedict Kingsbury et al, 
‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68(3/4) Law and Contemporary 
Problems 15, 44–5. 
39 For a description of financial regulation as a coordination problem see Chris Brummer, ‘How 
International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t)’ (2011) 99 Georgetown Law Journal 
257. 
40 See John C Coffee, ‘Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come Home’ 
(2014) 99(6) Cornell Law Review 1259, 1269–71, claiming that financial stability is a ‘public 
good’, exposed to the ‘tragedy of the commons’. 
41 Another means is the shaming of a rogue state. See Brummer (n 24) 50–7 and 170–5. See also 
David Zaring, ‘Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation’ (2012) 52(3) Virginia 
Journal of International Law 683, 685–6. 
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— in particular its capacity to be created and changed fast, to be flexible and to 
be created by specialists (as opposed to political bodies) — but with some of 
the benefits of formal international law.  
Nonetheless, after the GFC efforts were made to enhance the financial 
regulatory architecture’s enforcement mechanisms even further. Almost every 
regulation created by the global bodies after the crisis is accompanied by a 
supervisory methodology which should be followed. Each regulation is 
followed by assessment reports, evaluating on a consistent basis the compliance 
of countries with the rules. In addition, the FSB has created a system of regular 
peer review of member states.42F42 The implementation of the Basel III framework 
provides a good example of these procedures, as it is being reviewed in no less 
than four different ways: through the Regulatory Consistency Assessment 
Programme whose report is published by the Committee every six months 
(starting in 2012), evaluating the progress of every member country in 
implementing the rules; through a thematic report, which extends the findings 
of the other reports; through the IMF’s reports, which also review the 
implementation of parts of Basel III; 43F43 and finally, through a review by the Bank 
for International Settlements (‘BIS’) on the implementation of Basel rules in 
non-member states.44F44  
These three changes lead to the conclusion that the global financial architecture 
after the crisis seems more coherent, united, and stronger than previously. The 
changes made to the architecture — structural, contents, and enforcement 
changes — are encouraging. However, given the past failures of the global 
architecture to prevent several financial crises, a realistic examination is in 
order before one can accept that ‘this time it is different’. This realistic 
examination calls for a deeper look into these changes.  
                                                 
42 As described by the FSB: ‘Peer Reviews’, Financial Stability Board (Web Page) 
<https://www.fsb.org/work-of-the-fsb/implementation-monitoring/peer_reviews/>. 
43 See the IMF’s financial sector assessment program: ‘Financial Sector Assessment Program’, 
International Monetary Fund (Fact Sheet, 8 March 2018) <https://www.imf.org/en/ 
About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/14/Financial-Sector-Assessment-Program>. 
44 See the Committee’s web site, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Web Page) 
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation.htm>. See also Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, ‘Basel III Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP)’ (October 
2013) 1–3 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs264.pdf>. 
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V THE POST-CRISIS ARCHITECTURE FROM AN INSIDER’S 
PERSPECTIVE 
A Fragmented Structure 
While trying to appreciate the perceived effectiveness of the consolidated 
model, its past experiments in financial regulation may provide valuable 
insights. In the spirit of the statement that ‘those who cannot remember the past 
are condemned to repeat it’, two such experiments will be examined: the 
Financial Stability Forum (‘FSF’) and the Financial Services Authority 
(‘FSA’). But first, a few more words on the FSB role are in order.   
As mentioned above, the FSB mostly does not on its own create the regulatory 
standards. For example, the FSB divided the formulation of regulation on 
shadow banking among three regulatory bodies, based on their expertise. The 
Committee was made responsible for dealing with the connections between the 
banking system and the shadow banking sector; IOSCO was made responsible 
for regulating MMFs, being investment vehicles that are supervised by 
securities regulation; and the FSB itself was responsible for creating the 
regulatory framework for the shadow banking sector and for regulating every 
institution or activity that holds the potential for risk and that  is not a bank or 
MMF.45 In a similar manner, the regulation of SIFIs was divided between four 
regulatory bodies. The Committee formulates regulation for globally important 
banks, IAIS formulates regulation for SIFIs that are insurance companies, 
IOSCO for SIFIs that are neither banks nor insurers, and the FSB is in charge 
of creating the general framework to be reported to the G-20.46  
More generally, and in accordance with its primary supervising role,47 the FSB 
joins together the regulations created by each of the standards-setting bodies to 
form a ‘compendium of standards’, which currently contains twelve standards 
                                                 
45 ‘Policy Recommendations for Money Market Funds: Final Report’ (‘IOSCO Policy 
Recommendations’), IOSCO (October 2012) 1–5 <https://www.immfa.org/assets/files/ 
publications/IOSCO%20Policy%20Recommendations%20for%20Money%20Market%20Fun
ds%20-%20Final%20Report%20-%20Oct%202012.pdf>; ‘Strengthening Oversight and 
Regulation of Shadow Banking: An Overview of Policy Recommendations’, Financial Stability 
Board (August 2013) i–iii <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130829a 
.pdf>.  
46 ‘Progress and Next Steps towards Ending ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ (TBTF): Report of the Financial 
Stability Board to the G-20’, Financial Stability Board (September 2013) <http://www. 
financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130902.pdf>. 
47 Zaring (n 41) 692 stating that: ‘[The FSB is] meant to oversee many of the others, engaged in 
their own task-specific work.’  
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set by the Committee, IOSCO, IAIS and others.48 This compendium represents 
the key standards needed for a resilient financial system. Both the compendium 
and the division of labour between the various bodies characterise the 
consolidated model.         
The first experiment of the consolidated model was the Financial Services 
Authority, founded in the UK in 1997. While it is a national body, and not a 
global regulatory body, this experiment provides additional support for the 
following discussion of the FSF, given the lack of any other global experiments. 
The FSA acquired its responsibilities gradually. In 1998 it became responsible 
for banking supervision, a responsibility transferred from the Bank of England; 
in 2000 it accepted responsibility for securities supervision and in 2004–2005 
for insurance regulation.49 The FSA’s original objective was to unite UK 
financial regulation under one authority, operating as a single regulator. 
However, after the FSA’s foundation, claims were made that it was not a united 
authority, but a collection of (still) separate bodies. It was further argued that 
the FSA’s structure mirrored the traditional sectorial boundaries, so that its 
‘Handbook’ for financial regulation was only an assemblage of rules, and not a 
coherent framework developed by the FSA.50  
The chief criticism was that the FSA was not a true ‘mega-regulator’, but 
operated in a way similar to the consolidated model. As it happens, the FSA 
was unable to make a true change in England’s financial architecture, which 
remained split between different regulators, despite being formally subject to a 
single authority. The FSA was abolished in 2010, and the aftermath of its 
abolition proves that the criticism was correct, as the areas of responsibility 
were divided again. Its mandate of prudential regulation was transferred back 
to the Bank of England and its mandate regarding consumer protection was 
transferred to the Financial Conduct Authority.51 The FSA’s abolition moved 
                                                 
48 The list of standards included in the compendium is available at ‘The Compendium of 
Standards’, Financial Stability Board <http://www.fsb.org/work-of-the-fsb/about-the-
compendium-of-standards/>. 
49 ‘History’, Financial Services Authority (Web Page, 14 June 2014) <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ 
about/who/history>. 
50 Joseph J Norton, ‘Global Financial Sector Reform: The Single Financial Regulator Model 
Based on the United Kingdom FSA Experience: A Critical Reevaluation’ (2005) 39(1) 
International Lawyer 15, 32–3. 
51 The Financial Conduct Authority was established in 2013, primarily to protect consumers in 
financial markets: ‘About the FCA’, Financial Conduct Authority (Web Page) <https://www. 
fca.org.uk/about/the-fca>. 
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England to the twin-peaks model.52 It seems safe to say that the FSA’s inability 
to supply coherent and effective financial regulation was a major reason for its 
abolition.  
The second implementation of the consolidated model confirms that the 
ineffectiveness of this model was not unique to the FSA. In 1999 a new global 
body was established, the Financial Stability Forum (‘FSF’). Its establishment 
followed the financial crisis in Asia, which had started in 1997. A major lesson 
learned from the Asian crisis was that global regulation should be implemented 
in a more coercive way in national regulation. Since global regulation is 
formulated by experts, it is more immune than national regulation to the 
political pressures that were seen as a major cause of that crisis.53 The FSF was 
supposed to function as a joint forum for the different regulatory bodies with a 
view to improving the enforcement of the global regulation. Over the years, the 
FSF issued a number of reports, and held several meetings. Unfortunately, the 
FSF’s destiny was no better than that of the FSA in the UK, as the FSF is 
regarded as a grand failure. The painful proof of its failure was that the UK was 
not immune to the GFC, which the FSF was in charge of preventing but did not 
even see coming.54 In hindsight, warning signs existed, such as the low level of 
activity initiated by the FSF and its little, if any, influence on financial 
regulation.  
The resemblance between the FSF and the current FSB, a body founded on the 
platform of the FSF, is recognisable. Both were established after a crisis and 
were trying to meet the need for greater unity in global architecture. Both kept 
the main burden on the shoulders of the regulatory bodies, while trying to 
improve cooperation between global regulators and the enforcement of their 
‘soft law’ products. Both the FSF and the FSB act primarily as supervising 
authorities. It is true that the FSB is not identical to the FSF; on the contrary, 
changes — such as an increase in the number of participants and a broadening 
of its mandate — were made in order to improve its function, based on the 
                                                 
52 For the abolition of the FSF see Financial Conduct Authority (Web Page, 2019) 
<www.fsa.gov.uk>. See also Eilis Ferran, ‘The Break-Up of the Financial Services Authority’ 
(2011) 31(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 455, 455–65. 
53 Barry J Eichengreen, Toward a New International Financial Architecture (Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, 1999) 10–12 and 32–4.  
54 For a discussion of the failure of the FSF see Enrique R Carrasco, ‘The Global Financial Crisis 
and the Financial Stability Forum: The Awakening and Transformation of an International 
Body’ (2010) 19(1) Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 203, 205–8. See also 
Brummer (n 24) 266 (stating that: ‘The 2008 financial crisis ... also unveiled with tragic clarity 
that the national and international regulations in place prior to the crisis to ensure global 
financial stability were far from adequate.’) and David Zaring, ‘International Institutional 
Performance in Crisis’ (2010) 10(2) Chicago Journal of International Law 475, 485, 497, 503.  
80 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 24 
lessons from the FSF’s failure. However, the FSB shares with the FSF the 
fundamental characteristic of being a supervisory body, in a way that raises 
serious doubts regarding the FSB’s ability to rise above its predecessor. Even 
though the changes made are likely to improve the function of the FSB,55 the 
basic flaws inherent in this consolidated model, as pointed out above, call for 
further investigation.56  
After the GFC the separated regulatory bodies — the Committee, IOSCO and 
IAIS — continue to create most of the global financial regulation. This enables 
the expertise needed to handle the complexity of each financial field to be 
brought to bear. At the same time, the fact that the same regulatory bodies that 
created the regulation before the crisis are still the ones creating it now is 
worrisome. If the occurrence of the crisis showed the inability of those bodies 
to even mitigate it, the lack of a change in the regulating bodies should raise 
concern.  
Moreover, the regulatory structure is still a fragmented one. The establishment 
of the FSB should (and probably will) contribute to a more coherent 
supervision, but will the FSB make it coherent enough? A supervisory body 
may be able to close up some of the holes in financial regulation, but it might 
not be able to completely reconstruct a piecemeal regulation. If the current 
structure is still fragmented, the perceived effectiveness of the regulation 
produced by it is another source of concern.57 In order to affirm or dismiss this 
concern, three segments of current regulation will be examined: 1) the liquidity 
coverage ratio — a part of the Basel III framework for banks, 2) the regulation 
of MMFs, and 3) the regulation of repos — all performed under the supervision 
of the FSB. These segments were chosen since they represent the most novel 
and best parts of the new regulation after the crisis. Additionally, as these 
segments come from different financial fields, and were created by different 
regulators, they enable a relatively broad view of the post-crisis regulation.  
B Fragmented Contents  
During the GFC, it became evident that the phenomenon known as a ‘run on 
the bank’ had expanded to other financial fields. A ‘run on the bank’ is an event 
in which many depositors withdraw their deposits from their bank, in a very 
                                                 
55 Helleiner, What Role for the New Financial Stability Board (n 31) 284–85. 
56 That is not to say, of course, that no change is better, or to recommend returning to three 
separate specialised authorities. 
57 For pointing out that this model at the national level (‘lead regulator’) is not an effective model, 
see Pan, Structural Reform of Financial Regulation (n 33) 822. For a general connection 
between structure and outcomes see Broz and Frieden (n 3) 330. 
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short period of time. A bank does not hold enough liquid assets to fulfil all of 
its obligations at once. The essence of a bank’s activity is the performance of 
maturity transformation (‘MT’), which is lending long while borrowing short, 
profiting from the interest difference. A bank works at ‘fractional reserve’ (that 
is, it keeps only a certain portion of its assets available), meaning that the bank 
can redeem only a part of requests accepted at any given time.  
A ‘run’ on a bank can cause the deterioration of a stable bank, just because of 
rumours about its supposedly poor financial situation. In addition, a ‘run’ on 
one bank, in conjunction with asymmetric information regarding the quality of 
other banks’ loan portfolios, can spread to other banks, and cause a ‘bank 
panic’. From the banking system, the panic can develop into a far wider 
economic crisis, due to links between the financial system and the real 
economy.58  
As this phenomenon is quite well known in the banking sector, three strategies 
have been developed to cope with it: 1) the central bank’s role as lender of last 
resort, 2) deposit insurance (usually provided by a governmental institution) 
and 3) capital ratios that banks must maintain. The first two offer liquidity, or 
a solid guarantee to provide it, as a solution to the troubled bank. Providing 
liquidity, or the guarantee of it, could mitigate the effect of the ‘first mover 
advantage’.59 The third solution tries to keep the banks generally more solvent, 
but does not handle a lack of liquidity, which is the source of a run on the bank. 
Understanding that capital ratio is not sufficient to handle a bank run, the capital 
rules of Basel II were supplemented in the Basel III framework with new 
liquidity demands.60    
Until the GFC the phenomenon of runs on the financial institution was thought 
to affect mainly banks. However, the recent crisis revealed the susceptibility of 
other financial institutions to a similar ‘run’ syndrome. As I have explained 
elsewhere, it turned out that a ‘run on the bank’ can happen, and indeed did 
                                                 
58 Douglas W Diamond and Philip H Dybvig, ‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity’ 
(1983) 91(3) Journal of Political Economy 401; Carmen M Reinhart and Kenneth S Rogoff, 
‘The Aftermath of Financial Crises’ (Working Paper No 14656/2009, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, January 2009) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14656>. 
59 This incentive to withdraw money early (to be the ‘first mover’) arises as the bank does not 
have enough cash to fulfil all of its obligations. 
60 For the difference between solvency and liquidity see Anat R Admati et al, ‘Fallacies, 
Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not 
Expensive’ (Working Paper No 86/2011, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford 
University, 22 October 2011) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1669704>. 
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happen, in MMFs, which are collective investment vehicles.61 They are funds 
in which an investor acquires shares redeemable on demand. Each share reflects 
the investor’s relative portion of the fund’s assets. MMFs invest in money 
market instruments, investments considered safe and relatively liquid. 
Despite the formal difference between MMFs and banks, they both share a 
similar mode of operation at MT, which is the dominant cause of a potential 
run.62 During the last crisis MMFs experienced a ‘run on the fund’.63 The most 
prominent example was the run on the Reserve Primary Fund, a major US MMF 
which managed assets worth USD 62 billion, leading to its liquidation. This 
fund collapsed after receiving USD 60 billion in redemption requests in the four 
days following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, despite the fact that its 
exposure to Lehman’s toxic assets amounted to only USD 785 million.64 The 
run on this fund led to runs on other funds, so that in one week, USD 300 billion 
were withdrawn from MMFs.65 In the summer of 2011, a ‘slow-motion run’ hit 
the prime MMF sector as fears about European sovereign debt problems 
mounted, causing redemptions of more than USD 170 billion in approximately 
two months. The ‘run’ phenomenon also appeared during the crisis in other 
financial fields, such as repos, as will be further discussed below. 
Appearing in different financial sectors, the ‘run on the bank’ problem offers 
an exceptional case-study of the degree of coherence that global regulation has 
achieved since the crisis. Given the extensive efforts to harmonise global 
financial regulation, one could expect that, after the crisis, a similar problem 
will result, with a similar regulatory solution (with the appropriate adjustments, 
of course). As a short comparison of the regulatory treatment of the ‘run on the 
                                                 
61 Dalit Flaiszhaker, ‘A Macroprudential Perspective on the EU Regulation of Money Market 
Funds’ in Edoardo Chitti and Giulio Vesperini (eds), The Administrative Architecture of 
Financial Integration: Institutional Design, Legal Issues, Perspectives (il Mulino, 2015) 273–
5. 
62 Morgan Ricks, ‘Regulating Money Creation after the Crisis’ (2011) 1 Harvard Business Law 
Review 75, 104–6. For a (restrained) acknowledgement that MMFs operate by fractional reserve 
see Jonathan Macey, ‘Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual Funds as 
Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank Deposits’ (2012) 17(1) Stanford Journal of Law, 
Business and Finance 131, 153–4. 
63 Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘Money 
Market Fund Systemic Risk Analysis and Reform Options: Consultation Report’ (‘MMF 
Consultation Report’) IOSCO (27 April 2012) 5–6 <https://www.iosco.org/library 
/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD379.pdf>. 
64 Jonathan W Lim, ‘Untangling the Money Market Fund Problem: A Public-Private Liquidity 
Fund Proposal’ (2013) 19(1) Stanford Journal of Law, Business and Finance 63, 75–7. 
65 MMF Consultation Report (n 63) 56. 
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bank’ phenomenon in three different sectors shows, this is not the case with 
post-crisis global financial law; it is still fragmented.  
One prominent reform introduced by the Basel III framework is the 
introduction of new liquidity and funding demands.66 The new liquidity 
demands are divided into two parts,67 the first being the liquidity coverage ratio 
(‘LCR’), implemented in all 27 Committee member jurisdictions.68 The LCR 
is intended to assure the ability of a bank to survive a short-term crisis. Its basic 
rationale is that, if a bank holds enough liquidity to last through a 30 day crisis, 
this will enable its managers and the regulators to consider proper future steps 
needed to prevent its collapse.  
The LCR requires a bank to hold a sufficient stock of high-quality liquid assets 
(‘HQLA’) to cover its total net cash outflows over the next 30 days. The ratio 
between the HQLA (the numerator) and the net outflows (the denominator) 
should equal at least 1.69 By equalising the potential obligations the bank will 
need to meet in a one month period to its liquid assets (that is, assets that are 
available or can be made available immediately without great loss of value), 
this formula guarantees that the bank will be more resilient to a run scenario. 
As a result of applying the LCR, if the bank wishes to take on more obligations, 
it needs to have more liquid assets. The LCR rule specifies which assets can be 
regarded as HQLA. For example, cash and central bank reserves, or sovereign 
bonds (subject to certain conditions and deductions), are the highest level of 
assets. The rule also calculates the ‘net cash outflows’ by subtracting the 
income cash flow (such as payments and interest) from the cash outflows (such 
as deposits). In addition, to prevent banks from relying fully on a future cash 
income, a bank needs to hold HQLA amounting to at least 25% of its cash 
outflows (regardless of the cash inflows).70 
                                                 
66 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and 
Liquidity Risk Monitoring Tools (January 2013) (‘LCR’) <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs 
238.pdf>. 
67 See Andrew W Hartlage, ‘The Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Financial Stability’ 
(2012) 111(3) Michigan Law Review 453, 462–5. 
68 For the ratio implementation as of November 2018 see Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, ‘Implementation of Basel Standards’, Bank for International Settlements 
(November 2018) <https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d453.pdf>. 
69 The LCR also includes five monitoring tools, designed to provide a complete picture of the 
bank business: LCR (n 66) [174]–[176].  
70 Ibid [144]. 
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The second part of the liquidity framework is the net stable funding ratio 
(‘NSFR’), whose implementation process was set at the end of 2017.71 This rule 
focuses on improving the funding origins of the bank, with the intention of 
enhancing its liquidity in the timeframe of a year. Assuring more stable funding 
will minimise obstacles in funding that may erode the bank’s liquidity, for 
example in the event that the funder itself experiences difficulties in providing 
the relied-upon funding to the bank.72 To create a stable funding profile, the 
NSFR limits the bank’s capacity to rely on short-term wholesale funding which 
is considered relatively risky, and encourages a better evaluation of the funding 
sources inside and outside the bank’s balance.  
The NSFR is designed to counteract the bank’s natural inclination to enlarge its 
leverage (since high leverage means potentially higher profits), by making it 
more difficult for the bank to use cheap and unstable funding sources. The 
NSFR sets a basic formula which upholds the ratio between the ‘available stable 
funding’ and the ‘required stable funding’ at 1 or more. For calculating the 
available stable funding, the obligations of the bank are divided into five 
categories based on the stability of the funding, and the required funding is 
divided into seven categories, based on the probability that the asset will need 
to be funded in a period of one year. 
Two assumptions underlie the methods used to calculate the ‘available’ and 
‘required’ funding, to show the degree of stability of each obligation. Long-
term funding is considered more stable than short-term funding, and retail (and 
small business) funding is regarded as more stable than wholesale funding.73  
Integrating both parts, the liquidity framework deals with both sides of the 
bank’s risk-creating activity. The LCR addresses the bank’s assets, and obliges 
it to hold enough of them for times of stress. At the same time, the NSFR 
handles the obligations, and forces the bank to rely on more stable funding 
sources, to prevent a situation in which the bank can no longer fund the loans it 
has granted.  
                                                 
71 ‘Basel III: The Net Stable Funding Ratio’, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(Consultative Document, January 2014) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs271.pdf> (‘NSFR’). As 
of November 2018, 25 members of the Committee have issued final or draft rules to implement 
it: see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (n 68).  
72 A bank acquires short-term funding (in the form of deposits or loans from other financial 
institutions), and lends the money for longer periods. If the short-term funding is stopped, the 
bank will not be able to continue to refinance its outstanding loans, meaning it will be insolvent.  
73 NSFR (n 71) [12].  
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The need to set liquidity rules at the global level is due to liquidity’s costs. 
Keeping a higher stock of HQLA is equivalent to keeping some of the money 
idle or at least not as profitable as it could have been (if lent long). The inability 
to use these assets to extend more loans is costly since loans carry profit, in the 
form of interest. By the same token, a more stable funding is usually more 
expensive to the bank. These costs, unless demanded uniformly at the global 
level, can cause a race to the bottom between states, just as the capital adequacy 
issue did, with potential for similar harmful consequences. It seems as if the 
liquidity framework could be effective in mitigating a run on the bank, as it 
limits the bank’s risk-creating activity and provides for a liquidity solution to 
be used in times of stress.74      
However, these effective liquidity demands are lacking in the regulatory 
treatment of MMFs. Following a run on MMFs, and in accordance with the 
methodology established by the post-GFC architecture as described above, the 
FSB ordered IOSCO to prepare recommendations for the MMF sector. MMFs 
fall within IOSCO’s field of expertise, being investment funds.75 In October 
2012, after publishing a ‘consulting report’, IOSCO published its 
recommendations. The recommendations are divided into six major parts, the 
relevant ones of which will be described.  
First, the recommendations identify an MMF as every fund designed to promise 
a daily liquidity and yield. This relatively broad definition is intended to 
encompass every fund which imitates MMFs, even if it operates by a different 
name, so as to prevent regulatory arbitrage.76 Second, the funds are to be 
allowed to be invested only in specific types of assets — relatively short-term 
ones — as a means of mitigating the maturity mismatch.77 The fifth 
recommendation relates to ‘liquidity management’, the sixth recommendation 
deals with issuing ‘know your investor’ policies, and the eighth 
                                                 
74 Depending, naturally, on other issues such as enforcement.  
75 As stated in the recommendations: ‘The September 2008 run on some money market funds 
(MMFs) alerted regulators to the systemic relevance of MMFs. Although MMFs did not cause 
the crisis, their performance during the financial turmoil highlighted their potential to spread or 
even amplify a crisis. … [C]oncerns remain regarding the stability of the money market fund 
industry and the risks it may pose for the broader financial system. In this regard, the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) asked the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) to undertake a review of potential regulatory reforms of MMFs that would mitigate 
their susceptibility to runs and other systemic risks and to develop policy recommendations’: 
IOSCO Policy Recommendations (n 45) 3. 
76 IOSCO Policy Recommendations (n 45) pts 1–3. 
77 For a conservative fund it is recommended that the MT of total assets should not exceed 60 
days, and the MT of each instrument should not exceed 120 days: IOSCO Policy 
Recommendations (n 45) 11 (Recommendation 2). 
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recommendation deals with periodic stress tests. The seventh recommendation 
sets a minimum threshold of assets that each fund should hold in a very liquid 
form (such as a deposit in a known bank) to enable the fund to immediately 
answer redemption requests. Yet the recommendation does not specify the 
exact amount of assets the fund should hold or how this threshold should be 
determined by the regulators. Without such accurate definitions, the 
recommendation could not be effective enough.78 The recommendations state 
that, in order to deal with a ‘run’ on the fund, the fund should have means to 
hold redemption requests for a certain period of time,79 and should refrain from 
concentrating too many of the fund’s shares with one shareholder. Additionally, 
the recommendations set disclosure requirements and accounting methods to 
be used in calculating the value of the fund’s shares.80  
Hence, a comparison of the new global regulation of banks with the new global 
regulation of MMFs shows crucial differences. Despite the similarity in their 
modes of operation and in their exposure to a run, as was evidenced in the GFC, 
the adopted solutions are different. Whereas the regulation of banks includes 
stringent liquidity and leverage demands, these demands are not made of 
MMFs. It should be mentioned that the similarity between banks and MMFs 
was not disregarded by IOSCO. An earlier draft of the recommendations 
considered the possibility of transforming MMFs into ‘special purpose banks’, 
due to their functional similarity and exposure to a run.81 In the final 
recommendations, however, this solution was not adopted. A similar choice, to 
prescribe different solutions to the ‘run’ phenomenon according to the type of 
institution, was made in the regulation of repos.   
A repo is a repurchase transaction in which the ‘borrower’ (for example, a bank) 
sells an asset (for example, bonds) to the ‘lender’. The seller/borrower commits 
to buying back the asset at the end of an agreed period of time, at an agreed 
price. The price reflects an increase compared to the initial sum ‘paid’ for the 
asset by the buyer/lender, an increase equal to the interest on a loan. Until the 
buy-back of the asset (that is, the repaying of the loan), it stands as collateral.82 
                                                 
78 Ibid pt 7. 
79 Ibid pt 9. 
80 The ‘amortised cost’ accounting method, and its implications for the price of each of the fund’s 
shares, will not be discussed. IOSCO recommends that most of the funds will be of variable 
price as opposed to stable pricing method, which is more prone to a run: ibid pts 4–5, 10, 13–
14.  
81 MMF Consultation Report (n 63) 20. 
82 For the collateral to cover the full amount of the loan, the lender demands and accepts assets 
worth more than the initial sum given. Therefore, the asset is not fully used, since 100% of it is 
used to cover a loan worth, for example, only 90%. 
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The same collateral can support multiple transactions (a phenomenon described 
as ‘re-hypothecation’ or ‘re-use’), ‘just as one dollar of cash can lead to a 
multiple of demand deposits at a bank’.83F83 These characteristics of repo 
transactions make them vulnerable to the run syndrome, as these transactions 
are based on a method similar to fractional reserve. Therefore, it has been 
argued that, during the GFC, we have witnessed a ‘run on repos’.84F84 A similar 
rationale led the FSB to justify the creation of new regulation of repos (and of 
securities lending more generally): 
[T]he use of securities lending and repos can lead to ‘bank-like’ activities 
such as creating ‘money-like’ liabilities, carrying out maturity/liquidity 
transformation, and obtaining leverage, including short-term financing of 
longer-term assets, some of which may run the risk of becoming illiquid …85 
Consequently, the recommendations published by the FSB in 2013 identify two 
groups of risks that repo transactions generate: 1) risks originating from the 
shadow banking sector, as it is not fully supervised by existing regulation, and 
2) risks that repo transactions pose for the banking system, mainly due to the 
high involvement of banks in this market. The recommendations for repo 
transactions deal with three major topics: 1) improving the transparency of the 
transactions, 2) the re-use of collateral, and 3) changing the markets for secured 
financing towards central clearing.86 The two relevant recommendations for our 
discussion are the sixth and the tenth. 
The sixth recommendation requires the national authorities to set a minimum 
threshold for the re-hypothecation of collateral. In the tenth recommendation, 
the FSB recommends that the national authorities evaluate the costs and 
benefits of setting up a central counterparty clearing system, in which all 
members perform their repo transactions with one central body. The central 
clearing is supposed to lower the interdependency between financial 
                                                 
83 Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, ‘Haircuts’ (2010) 92(6) Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Review 507, 510.  
84 Ibid. The authors’ detailed explanation is that on occasions of market instability, when 
information regarding the financial state of each specific institution is lacking, the collateral 
undergoes large ‘haircuts’.  
85 ‘Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: Policy Framework for 
Addressing Shadow Banking Risks in Securities Lending and Repos’ (‘Repo 
Recommendations’), Financial Stability Board (29 August 2013) 4 <http://www.financial 
stabilityboard.org/publications/r_130829b.pdf>.  
86 Recommendations 1–5 handle the need to enhance the information gathering of the transactions 
performed and recommendations 8–9 set rules for the proper evaluation of the securities: Repo 
Recommendations (n 85) 7–19. 
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institutions, as the transactions are performed in a net manner (and not 
bilaterally).       
As can be noticed, the regulatory methods of supervising MMFs and repos are 
very similar. Both methods recommend that the national authorities set a level 
of liquid assets that must be maintained or a level at which the re-use of 
collateral is permissible, respectively, but neither specifies what exactly this 
level should be. Both recommendations focus mainly on the 
transparency/disclosure requirements, which may be important in themselves, 
but cannot deal with a ‘run’.87 And neither limits the risk-creating activity of 
MMFs and repos.  
The banking framework described above limits the possibility of a bank 
granting more loans (depending on its level of liquid assets). By contrast, 
neither of the shadow banking recommendations described in the framework 
limits the option of performing more risk-creating activities. And neither of the 
recommendations handles liquidity solutions, as done by the liquidity 
framework applied to banks, described above.  
These three samples — the liquidity coverage ratio applied to banks, the 
regulation of MMFs, and the regulation of repos — together form a unified 
understanding of the global regulation after the crisis. This regulation presents 
different solutions to a similar problem, depending on the type of institution. 
As explained above, regulatory arbitrage between states can have damaging 
outcomes with regards to stability. In a similar manner, regulatory arbitrage 
between financial sectors can have damaging outcomes.88 The reason is basic: 
prohibiting (or limiting) a dangerous activity in one field can push it towards 
another field, from which it can infect all other sectors. Regulatory arbitrage is 
a worrisome phenomenon, particularly in the financial field, since it creates 
‘holes’ in the supervision coverage.89 The need to cast the regulatory net wide 
by developing macro-prudential policy, as explained above, is meant to prevent 
the circumvention of limitations imposed on one kind of financial institution by 
the use of other kinds of institution or transaction. However, as the examination 
                                                 
87 That is because the only way to prevent a run, or to mitigate it after it has started, is to provide 
guarantees for the money invested in financial institutions.  
88 As the FSB states: Repo Recommendations (n 85) 2. 
89 One could argue that the difference in the activities of each sector calls for different solutions. 
This may be true (to some extent), in regard to some needed adjustments. Yet this argument is 
not relevant since it does not deal with the effectiveness problem, and especially not with the 
regulatory arbitrage problem. For regulatory arbitrage in a financial system see Erik F Gerding, 
Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation (Routledge, 2013). 
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of three segments of the post-crisis regulation has shown, even after the GFC 
financial regulation continues to be fragmented. 
C Global Financial Regulation — A Unique Democratic 
Deficit  
Two possible explanations can be offered for this fragmented nature of the 
current architecture. The first is founded on political considerations. It could be 
that the bodies existing before the crisis were not enthusiastic about the idea 
that they needed to be abolished (or fundamentally reshaped). These institutions 
preferred to preserve their existence and power, and applied pressure against a 
dramatic change. For example, any acknowledgment of the similarity between 
MMFs and banks may cause the removal of the former from IOSCO’s sphere 
of responsibility. For IOSCO, this would mean losing a significant amount of 
its influence. Yet public opinion demanded a change that would implement the 
lessons of the GFC and could not be ignored by the architects. This caused what 
de Tocqueville sharply described nearly 200 years ago: 
Under these circumstances, the result was, that the rules of logic were broken, 
as is usually the case when interests are opposed to arguments. A middle 
course was hit upon by the legislators, which brought together by force two 
systems theoretically irreconcilable.90  
The result of the colliding political considerations was a convergence of the 
multiple regulator model with the single regulator model, to create the 
consolidated model at the global level. This convergence enabled the architects 
to respond to the need for change without rocking the foundations of the 
previous system. According to this explanation, the FSB’s configuration is a 
compromise between two models, structured in such a way that not only does 
it not have the virtues of either, but that it has inherited many of their vices.  
Another possible explanation is a conceptual fixation on the part of the 
regulators. According to this explanation, the absence of change derives from 
the regulators’ belief that their way of observing the financial system is the 
correct one. Regulators prefer to cling (even unknowingly) to the same old 
fundamentals, allowing no room for the contemplation of completely fresh 
ideas. This could explain, for example, the difference between the regulation of 
banks and of shadow banking (MMFs and repos). Regulators continue to follow 
the formal definitions of financial institutions — if it is a ‘bank’, a specific 
regulation by a specific regulator should apply, and if it is a ‘fund’, a different 
                                                 
90 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, tr Henry Reeve (Sever and Francis, 1863) vol 
I, ch VIII ‘The Federal Constitution’ 148. 
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regulation should be implemented. Hanging on to these formal definitions 
blinds the regulators to the true (similar) activity of the two types of institution, 
and prevents regulators from adjusting the regulation accordingly. In this mode 
of thinking, the only plausible way forward is to make changes to an already 
existing framework, as opposed to rethinking everything anew.91  
That is not to say, of course, that a change is always desirable. There are 
situations in which a change can be for the worse. But in the case of the global 
financial architecture, as the GFC has shown, a change is undoubtedly needed.92 
It seems that the fragmented architecture, regardless of the immediate cause of 
its fragmentation, will not likely be able to prevent the next crisis.93 Given the 
harsh consequences of a financial crisis, a fragmented global architecture — 
representing a flaw in the primary gatekeeper against such a crisis — is very 
worrisome.  
VI The Paradox of Global Financial Regulation 
Part V above analysed the regulatory efforts from the effectiveness angle, in 
order to appreciate their expected success. For this purpose, the Part focused on 
the ‘risk-potential’ aspect of the financial activity of credit creation. Yet, 
representing the core of the financial system, the issue of credit creation cannot 
be narrowed down to this one aspect of risk; instead, it requires a widening of 
the examination lens.  
The primary goal of global financial regulation is to provide a level playing 
field of prudential regulatory standards, as explained in Part II above. 
Therefore, implementing global financial regulation does limit the sovereignty 
of the adopting state to some extent, as that state cannot choose freely its own 
                                                 
91 For a similar line of explanation, see Paul Krugman, ‘How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?’, 
New York Times (online, 2 September 2009) <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/ 
06Economic-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>. 
92 See also Eric Helleiner and Stefano Pagliari, ‘Between the Storms: Patterns in Global Financial 
Governance, 2001–07’ in Geoffrey Underhill, Jasper Blom and Daniel Mügge (eds), Global 
Financial Integration Thirty Years On: From Reform to Crisis (Cambridge University Press, 
2010) 42; Eric Helleiner, ‘Crisis and Response: Five Regulatory Agendas in Search of an 
Outcome’ [2009] 1 Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft (International Politics and Society) 
11 and Eric Helleiner, ‘Reregulation and Fragmentation in International Financial Governance’ 
(2009) 15(1) Global Governance 16. 
93 Based on the inherent instability of the financial system, it seems reasonable to assume that 
another crisis will happen. The relevant question is not if it will happen, but what is being done 
to prevent or mitigate it. On the abovementioned inherent instability see Hyman P Minsky, The 
Financial Instability Hypothesis (Working Paper No 74, Jerome Levy Economics Institute, 
May 1992) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=161024>. 
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method of stability; yet global regulation is not intended to greatly influence 
the state’s discretion in managing its economy. This apparent trade-off is 
presented as a ‘win-win’ situation. In exchange for giving up some relatively 
small part of its sovereign rights in the technical field of financial regulation in 
favour of experts at the global level, the state benefits from a stable global 
financial system.94  
This trade-off may be compromised if global regulation is unable to provide 
effective regulatory coverage. In that case, it could be that the price paid is 
higher than the expected stability gain. A few preliminary words on the general 
function of a financial system in a state’s economy are needed to better 
appreciate the price of such a trade-off.          
The essential objective of every financial system is to supply the credit needed 
to sustain a productive economy. It performs this task by intermediating 
between those seeking a yield from money they currently hold (‘savers’), and 
those who lack money but need finance for intended economic activity 
(‘borrowers’). In its simplified version, ‘banking’ is financial intermediation — 
transferring money from savers to borrowers who need money for a productive 
purpose, such as financing an invention, building, or manufacturing.95 The net 
profit generated from this economic activity will be shared by the borrower with 
the bank (which in turn will share it with its savers), in the form of interest. The 
‘gross’ profit to society in general of this intermediation is derived from the 
creation of new firms, new products, and new jobs. Without the initial access 
to credit, the entrepreneur will be unable to materialise an idea.96 An efficient 
financial system is a system which collects credit and then channels it from the 
financial system into the real economy. In this regard, the risk inherent in the 
financial activity (that is, the creation of credit) can be justified since it is a 
necessary component of a functioning economy.  
                                                 
94 For an accurate description of the interest that a state has in cooperating with the IMF, a 
description that is also relevant to the architecture in general, see Robert Hockett, ‘From Macro 
to Micro to “Mission-Creep”: Defending the IMF’s Emerging Concern with the Infrastructural 
Prerequisites to Global Financial Stability’ (Research paper No 06-038, Cornell Law School, 
2006) 182 <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lsrp_papers/62>. This does not contradict the 
incentive to defect, described above, in order to achieve more benefits.  
95 With the development of banking, banks no longer act as mere intermediaries. They are also 
able to create credit almost anew, operating by virtue of fractional reserve banking. For further 
discussion of this see L Randall Wray, Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics 
for Sovereign Monetary Systems (Palgrave MacMillan, 2nd ed, 2012) ch 3. 
96 Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (Henry S King, 1873) 
6–20. See also Robert Hockett, ‘Bretton Woods 1.0: A Constructive Retrieval for Sustainable 
Finance’ (2013) 16(2) New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 401, 420–
5. 
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This linkage to the real economy is supposed to be at the heart of any financial 
intermediation. Yet, despite the similarities in functions described above, it 
could be argued that the shadow banking sector has looser connections to the 
real economy than banks do. The shadow banking sector is composed primarily 
of investment banks and other financial institutions, performing high-end 
sophisticated financial activity with advanced financial instruments. The exact 
contribution of the sizable shadow banking sector to the real economy is 
questionable, at best.97 What is clear is that the sector is much less accessible 
to all parts of the population than banks are.98  
The rise of shadow banking can be pictured as a part of a larger phenomenon, 
namely ‘financialisation’.99 Financialisation occurs when the financial system 
grows to a point where it becomes estranged from the real economy. Shadow 
banking can be regarded as a kind of ‘evolution’ of the ‘traditional’ financial 
activity, needed in order to accommodate modern conditions. On the one hand, 
shadow banking can be used to enlarge the amount of available credit and to 
lower its price.100 Yet, if it becomes the primary focus of the financial system 
and attracts much of its activity, it could mean that credit is used more for 
speculative activity or for investing in other financial instruments. Whereas 
banks have a rather direct link to the real economy through deposits and loans, 
                                                 
97 The contribution of shadow banking is under current debate within the economic literature: see 
Emmanuel Farhi and Jean Tirole, ‘Shadow Banking and the Four Pillars of Traditional 
Financial Intermediation’ (Working Paper 23930, NBER, October 2017) 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w23930.pdf>. For our purposes here, the simple fact that such 
contribution is, at the very least, contested, is sufficient.  
98 Tamara Lothian, ‘After the Crisis: Institutional Innovation and the Alternative Futures of 
American Finance’ (Working Paper No 386, Columbia University, 15 June 2011) 15–16 
<http://works.bepress.com/tamara_lothian/5/>. Tamara Lothian and Roberto Mangabeira 
Unger, ‘Crisis, Slump, Superstition and Recovery: Thinking and Acting beyond Vulgar 
Keynesianism’ (Unpublished paper, Columbia University, 1 March 2011) 
<http://works.bepress.com/tamara_lothian/10/>. See also Mian and Sufi (n 25).  
99 For a thorough description of ‘financialisation’ in the US, including an examination of relevant 
data and a consideration of counter-arguments, see Greta R Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: 
The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance (Harvard University Press, 2010) ch 2. Krippner 
also demonstrates the consequences of financialisation by showing that in the 1950s–1960s the 
financial system held 10–15% of the total profits in the US economy; in the 1980s this 
percentage rose to 30%, reaching its highest point of 40% in 2001. See also Verdier (n 8) 1415, 
claiming that in 2007 global financial activity was 343% of the world GDP.  
100 See, eg, ‘Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: Policy Framework for 
Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Entities’, Financial Stability 
Board (August, 2013) ii <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130829c. 
pdf>: ‘Such intermediation, appropriately conducted, provides a valuable alternative to bank 
funding that supports real economic activity. But experience from the crisis demonstrates the 
capacity for some non-bank entities and transactions to operate on a large scale in ways that 
create bank-like risks to financial stability...’ (emphasis added). 
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the connections between shadow banking and the real economy are indirect and 
much more questionable. The shadow banking sector, in general, does not 
engage directly with people looking to invest or in need of money, but rather 
engages with ‘behind the scenes’ financial activity.101 Financialisation 
materialises from the overgrowth of the shadow banking sector, since, as the 
shadow banking sector grows, the financial system grows — growth that is not 
necessarily accompanied by real economic growth.  
The new global regulation described above is expected to encourage future 
credit creation within the shadow banking sector. Due to the regulatory limits 
imposed on banks, the creation of credit will likely take place in the shadow 
banking sector, leading to its continuing growth. Indeed, in recent years, the 
shadow banking sector increased at about 8% per year, nearly double the 
growth rate of banks. It is currently responsible for about 30% of global 
financial assets, whereas banks are responsible for about 40%.102 The limits 
imposed by global regulation on the credit supply in the banking system, 
particularly the liquidity demands, may lower the risk levels in the banking 
system. Yet, the regulation is constraining the creation of credit in the banking 
system, while simultaneously enabling its creation almost freely in the shadow 
banking sector. As described above, there are almost no limitations to credit 
creation in MMFs, and there are no such limitations on repos.  
Encouraging the growth of the shadow banking sector, the new global 
regulation is likely to boost the process of financialisation. It will enlarge the 
disconnect between the financial system and the real economy and push them 
further apart. In this respect, regarding global financial regulation as neutral 
(that is, as supporting general growth, without influencing its distribution) is 
misleading.103 Roughly speaking, channelling credit to the real economy 
benefits the working class, whereas using credit for speculative purposes 
                                                 
101 The Bank of England surveyed the revenues of the 10 largest global investment banks in 2013. 
It determined that about three quarters of their revenues (around USD 140 billion) come from 
services to the financial system, and only one quarter from services directly to the real economy: 
Kushal Balluk, ‘Investment Banking: Linkages to the Real Economy and the Financial System’, 
Bank of England (Quarterly Bulletin, 9 March 2015) 9–10 <https://www.bankofengland. 
co.uk/quarterly-bulletin/2015/q1/investment-banking-linkages-to-the-real-economy-and-the-
financial-system>. Balluk states that there are differences between the activity of traditional 
banking and shadow banking, as the latter is more involved in sophisticated financial activities. 
102 ‘Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2017’, Financial Stability Board (5 March 2018) 
<https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P050318-1.pdf>. 
103 See Daphne Barak-Erez and Oren Perez, ‘Whose Administrative Law is it Anyway? How 
Global Norms Reshape the Administrative State’ (2013) 46(3) Cornell International Law 
Journal 455, 483–4, arguing that global regulation, more generally, has a hidden (neo-liberal) 
ideological dimension that needs to be exposed. 
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benefits the classes performing these activities: by and large the richer parts of 
society who own financial assets. Similarly, accessibility to shadow banking 
and its credit is easier for big firms and richer people. It is no surprise that in 
recent years we are witnessing growing inequalities between rich and poor.104 
The empirically-proven general fact that financial regulation affects socio-
economic sectors differently105 receives another confirmation from the above 
inspection of the post-crisis financial regulation.  
These consequences are not completely unnoticed by the leaders of the global 
regulatory architecture.106 For example, the decrease in credit creation for the 
real economy after the crisis has been pointed out as a worrying obstacle to 
economic recovery.107 In particular, the decrease in banking credit and in credit 
for small businesses is referred to as a problem.108F108 Additionally a correlation 
between the rise of shadow banking and the current financial system being 
                                                 
104 For an analysis of growing inequality, especially from the 1970s onward, see Thomas Piketty, 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century, tr Arthur Goldhammer (Harvard University Press, 2014), 
particularly in figures 10.5 and 10.6. Piketty does not argue that global financial regulation is 
the only (or even the most influential) cause for the concentration of wealth. It is argued, 
however, that the infrastructure of the global financial system is responsible for some of its 
outcomes.   
105 Dani Rodrik, ‘Normalizing Industrial Policy’ (Working Paper No 3, World Bank, 2008) 6, 
stating that: ‘Financial market imperfections … are best remedied, the counter-argument goes, 
by uniform measures that target financial markets … In practice most interventions, even those 
that are meant to be horizontal, necessarily favor some activities over others. For example, 
policies targeted at improving financial intermediation by commercial banks are partial to firms 
in the formal sector that have access to external finance, and discriminate against small and 
informal firms.’ See also Jonathan Kirshner, ‘The Inescapable Politics of Money’ in Jonathan 
Kirshner (ed), Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitious Politics (Cornell 
University Press, 2003) 3, 16. 
106 Broz and Frieden (n 3). For the issue of credit more generally see L Randall Wray, 
‘Alternative Approaches to Money’ (2010) 11(1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 29. It seems, 
based on this article, that viewing ‘money’ as not only a neutral means of exchange necessarily 
changes the way it should be regulated.  
107 ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, International Monetary Fund (October 2013) 65, 66–7 
<https://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2013/02/>: ‘As expected, higher bank funding 
costs and lower bank capital have reduced the ability of banks to supply loans, and high debt 
levels in firms and households (along with lower GDP growth forecasts) have lowered credit 
demand (and affected credit supply)’. Another example is the increased spread in interest paid 
for loans above USD 1 million in comparison to smaller loans doubling in the Euro area 
between 2007 and 2013.  
108 See Bill Allen et al, ‘Basel III: Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?’ (2012) 25 International 
Review of Financial Analysis 159, 163: ‘the liquidity requirements in Basel III are forcing banks 
both to contract their balance sheets and increase their holdings of liquid assets; this means they 
have to reduce non-liquid assets and restrict credit’ (emphasis added).  
2019 DISSONANCE IN GLOBAL FINANCIAL LAW 95 
prone to crises can be pointed to.109 Stability in the financial system is a means 
to promote growth, just as financial crises impede it. However, by turning the 
‘means’ (stability) into the end itself, it seems that global financial regulation 
is defeating its own greater purpose of providing regulation that supports a 
stable and efficient global financial system, to the benefit of economic 
growth..110  
It should not be thought that I am advocating the end of the shadow banking 
sector. Rather, my argument is that the regulatory choice made between 
different forms of financing, by limiting certain forms and allowing others, has 
implications for the real economy. Global financial regulation is not just 
bureaucratic regulation carried out by experts finding the best way to mitigate 
a crisis. Rather, it has a significant influence on how each national financial 
system is constructed and how the global financial system is constructed. 
Consequently, global financial regulation has substantial implications for our 
lives.  
The premise of global financial regulation is that it will focus on achieving 
stability for the benefit of all states (thus justifying its formulation by experts, 
at the global level), but at the same time will not influence matters such as how 
much credit will be created in each state or where this credit will be channelled. 
Those matters are traditionally conceived of as part of domestic monetary 
policy, based on the specific economic needs and wants of each state. It is 
harder for this paradigm to be persuasive, however, when it is considered that 
                                                 
109 As experience from the last decades shows, global financial crises are a repeated occurrence. 
Counterintuitive as it may seem, financial crises tend to affect the low-income sections of 
society, which are typically the ‘borrowers’ more than the high-income sections, typically the 
‘lenders’. In the immediate term, the GFC decreased the value of financial assets. However, 
due to a general decrease in the value of other assets, it turned out that, in the medium term after 
the crisis, owners of financial assets actually enlarged their relative portion (using the example 
of mortgages). Mian and Sufi show that in 1992 the wealth percentage held by the upper class 
was 66%, in 2007 it was 71%, and in 2010 (that is, after the crisis) it was 74%. On this basis 
they argue that the recent crisis has enlarged the (existing) gap between rich and poor in the 
US. They claim that a financial system based primarily on debt (in other words credit), enlarges 
inequality, since ‘debt’ affects the lender and the borrower differently. See Mian and Sufi (n 
25) ch 2, and 18–25, 44–5 and 76–9.   
110 The underlying assumption that these consequences are unintentional is sufficient for the 
needs of this article. One could wonder, however, if they serve certain power relationships or 
hierarchies. See generally Morton J Horwitz, ‘The Rise of Legal Formalism’ (1975) 19(4) 
American Journal of Legal History 251.    
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financial regulation cannot achieve ‘only’ stability without affecting the real 
economy.111  
I claim that global financial regulation has larger implications for a state’s 
financial system than is commonly discussed. Implementing global financial 
regulation determines not just the prudential level of a state’s financial system, 
but also substantial parts of its economy; implementing global financial 
regulation means not only giving up the ability to balance stability and 
competitiveness, but also the authority to decide how to distribute gains, using 
financial regulation. An understanding of these sovereignty costs leads to 
serious doubts regarding the legitimacy of global financial regulation — 
regulation which in a continuing process, and especially after the GFC, holds 
great coercive power. This power may be necessary, yet it still calls for stronger 
justifications.112  
The effectiveness of financial regulation is the current chief justification for its 
creation at the global level, as national law cannot alone handle the challenges 
presented by the globalised financial system.113 This effectiveness-based 
                                                 
111 For the claim that the ‘open-economy trilemma’ is problematic as there are still limitations on 
a country’s independent monetary policy, see Kirshner (n 105) 15–22.  
112 The stronger the enforcement, the higher are the sovereignty costs: Brummer (n 22) 260–5. 
For the relationships between ‘legal’ power and justifications more generally see Hanoch 
Dagan, Reconstructing American Legal Realism and Rethinking Private Law Theory (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) ch 2–4. 
113 For effectiveness as a means to achieve legitimacy see Brummer (n 22) 179–80: ‘Theories of 
output legitimacy thus justify authority not so much on the basis of processes and formal 
organizational qualities, but on the basis of an institution’s accomplishments. In a world of 
complex decision making, authority can be legitimized by its success in producing the desired 
outcomes — for example, social welfare gains or global financial stability.’ See also Tony 
Porter, ‘The G-7, the Financial Stability Forum, the G-20, and the Politics of International 
Financial Regulation’ (Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Annual 
Meeting, Los Angeles, California, 15 March 2000) <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/g20/biblio 
/porter-isa-2000.pdf>. There, while examining the establishment of the FSF, Porter suggests 
that: ‘[L]egitimacy is not just something created by the interactions of states nor is it an 
epiphenomenon of a large-scale compromise between social classes. It is also a characteristic 
of systems of rules that make them appear to be logical, coherent and fair. Legitimacy can be 
threatened, then, not just from non-compliance by states or by a strengthening counter-
hegemony, but also by contradictions and inadequacies in the systems of rules’: at 8. For the 
link between effectiveness and legitimacy at the global level, see Eyal Benvenisti, ‘“Coalitions 
of the Willing” and the Evolution of Informal International Law’ in Christian Calliess, Georg 
Nolte and Peter-Tobias Stoll (eds), Coalitions of the Willing: Avantgarde or Threat? (Carl 
Heymann, 2007) 1, 26–7: ‘Perhaps the most striking feature of the law made by coalitions of 
the willing is that its claim for legitimacy is not based on the idea of a coherent legal system in 
which states are equally sovereign and like cases are treated alike. ... Instead, this type of law’s 
claim for legitimacy is based on the perceived justness of the cause pursued by the coalition ... 
Affected governments and private actors will comply with these laws, not out of [sic] sense of 
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legitimacy has been relied upon since the emergence of the architecture, and 
has remained fundamentally untouched despite all crises.114 Effectiveness-
based legitimacy is compromised due to the expected failure of financial 
regulation to prevent the next crisis, as argued above.115 Yet the argument 
presented in this article also raises serious concerns regarding the current 
architecture’s democracy-based legitimacy.   
I argue that global financial regulation presents us with a unique democratic 
deficit. Global regulation is, at times, referred to as inherently suffering from a 
democratic deficit, arising from the lack of democratic participation in its 
formulation, in contrast to the democratic creation of state law. In particular, 
two democratic deficits are commonly attributed to global regulation:116 
1) administrative deficiencies (often discussed as part of ‘global administrative 
law’ or ‘GAL’), arising from several causes such as the lack of sufficient 
judicial review, of transparency and of due process; and 2) differences between 
a state’s ability to influence global decisions and the way these decisions 
influence that state. Accordingly, procedural solutions (for example, 
transparency and due process) are offered as a means to correct the first deficit, 
and cooperation is offered as a means to correct the second deficit.117 Such 
solutions definitely need to be part of the global financial architecture,118 but 
they cannot solve the unique deficit shown in this article, as this deficit is not a 
matter of procedural legitimacy. I argue that global financial regulation has a 
                                                 
legal obligation to do so, but rather out of fear of the adverse effects of non-compliance.’ See 
also Eyal Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance (Brill, 2014) 207–32. 
114 The primary goal of the global architecture is to achieve financial stability. The reforms focus 
on enhancing the means to achieve this goal, the same goal it pursued before the crisis.  
115 A clarification is in order, as it should not be thought that the offered solution is to go back, 
and to create financial regulation at the national level. I do not believe this is possible in the 
face of the existing financial system, and I do not have a strong opinion in regard to how 
desirable it would be. My comments should be read as a call for change to the current 
architecture.   
116 For a different approach see, eg, Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is there a “Democratic Deficit” in World 
Politics? A Framework for Analysis’ (2004) 39(2) Government and Opposition 336, 346; Paul 
E Hubble, ‘U.S. Agency Independence and the Global Democracy Deficit’ (2013) 88(5) New 
York University Law Review 1802, 1832–4. 
117 For the fragmentation of international law and its consequences see Benvenisti (n 113) 76–8 
and Eyal Benvenisti and George W Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy 
and the Fragmentation of International Law’ (2007) 60(2) Stanford Law Review 595. 
118 See, eg, Michael S Barr and Geoffrey P Miller, ‘Global Administrative Law: The View from 
Basel’ (2006) 17(1) European Journal of International Law 15, for a discussion of GAL and 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; and James B Kelly, ‘A Basis for Governing: 
Legitimacy, Accountability, and the Value of Uniform Principles for Global Administrative 
Law’ (2017) 86(5) Mississippi Law Journal 995, for a discussion of GAL and the World Trade 
Organization. 
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powerful effect on the economic wellbeing of the people, and consequently 
needs better democratic deliberation and participation than it currently receives. 
If financial regulation were, as commonly perceived, a technical means for 
experts to promote the greater good (stability and growth), perhaps only limited 
democratic participation would be needed. If, however, the situation is closer 
to that described in this article — with global choices affecting each and every 
one of us — the lack of deliberation and participation becomes crucial. The 
immense influence of such deficit is unique to financial regulation.  
The democratic deficit that I point to is the result of global financial regulation’s 
intrinsic characteristics (such as its influence on the real economies of states) 
and its being created at the global level by experts. The deficit has been even 
greater following the GFC, since the enforcement mechanisms of global 
financial regulation have become stronger. While this article does not take a 
position in the ongoing debate about the legitimacy of experts (for example, 
central banks) within the state, it does argue that, at the global level, their 
regulations create a deficit simply because they are more distant from (and less 
accountable to) those who are influenced by their actions than state institutions 
are.  
A comparison could be made to the creation of monetary policy at the global 
level.119 States have given up significant sovereign powers to try and maintain 
their monetary independence (within the framework of the ‘open-economy 
trilemma’). Given the implications that monetary policy has for the economy, 
it would seem unreasonable (to many scholars) to create global monetary 
policy. I argue that, today, regulating the financial system has no fewer 
implications for the economy.  
One could argue that, since global financial regulation is created in a ‘soft law’ 
manner and is implemented into states’ law, its legitimacy is based on the 
domestic institutions that adopt it. Once inserted into a domestic legal system, 
the argument could go, global regulation is transformed and legitimised. Such 
an argument could be convincing if it were not for global financial regulation’s 
stringent enforcement methods, as described above, and particularly its 
hardening of soft law. If indeed a state could opt out of certain global standards, 
but chose to adopt them, this could confer some legitimacy upon those global 
standards. Yet, as elaborated above, this is not the case for global financial 
regulation, in particular after the GFC.    
                                                 
119 For the close ties between the two see Frederic S Mishkin, ‘Monetary Policy Strategy: Lessons 
from the Crisis’ (Working Paper No 16755, NBER, February 2011) <http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w16755>.  
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As global unelected regulatory bodies determine parts of a state’s economy, 
while preferring certain socio-economic sectors over others, without 
deliberating upon these implications and without giving those affected a chance 
to influence the regulation, this deficit emerges. Leaving aside which choice is 
finally made, the main issue to address is to acknowledge that a choice is being 
made. If stability could indeed be achieved, a better case for global financial 
regulation could be made. In such a case, it could be argued that the benefit of 
global regulation — stability — exceeds its costs — the waiving of financial 
sovereignty. However if, as this article suggests, stability is not achieved, the 
costs are far more crucial.  
VI CONCLUDING REMARKS          
This article has provided an examination of the reforms made after the GFC in 
global financial architecture — structure and content alike. The examination 
was descriptive, but its results were critically analysed. As stability is the goal 
that financial regulation tries to achieve, the article has tried to assess whether 
it is likely to be achieved under the present architecture. Sadly, the findings are 
not encouraging. It seems that, despite all efforts to harmonise the structure, it 
remains fragmented; regulation continues to be created by the same bodies as 
before the crisis. While the FSB is likely to improve coordination between the 
regulatory bodies, it is unlikely to cause the change needed to avoid past 
mistakes.  
An examination of the contents of global financial regulation after the GFC 
tends to confirm this conclusion. A comparison of Basel III, as applied to banks, 
with global regulation for MMFs and repos shows that crucial differences exist 
at the exact points of risk. The different solutions that are offered to the problem 
of runs on financial institution may lead to a potential regulatory arbitrage. Such 
arbitrage could lead to more systemic risk in the financial system and thus 
counteract efforts to achieve more stability. Moreover, such arbitrage could 
lead to the growth of the shadow banking sector, along with growing 
financialisation more generally. These are phenomena whose implications for 
the real economy are yet to be fully researched.  
Consequently, this article argues that the global financial architecture falls short 
of achieving stability, and at the same time might have questionable effects on 
the financial system and its connection to the real economy. Its inability to 
provide effective legal solutions for financial crises jeopardises the legitimacy 
of the global architecture, which is based on effectiveness. Moreover, its 
implications for the financial system and the real economy, along with its global 
nature, lead to a unique democratic deficit. This deficit cannot be healed by the 
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use of common tools, such as transparency and due process. It calls for a 
reorganisation of the global financial architecture.  
The good news is that, as argued throughout this article, the architecture and its 
outcomes are the result of legal design and can therefore be changed to better 
achieve growth and equality.120 
                                                 
120 See Rawi Abdelal, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance (Harvard University 
Press, 2007) 218. 
